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A Tangled Web? Some Peripheral
Problems Under the Investment
Company Act
H. fames Sheedy
In recent years, several unique types of "investment companies" have
come into existence. These companies have presented serious problems
to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to the courts. Mr. Sheedy
examines the application of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to
these investment companies and critically analyzes the logic and pattern
of the 1940 Act, concluding that with respect to the peripheral types of
investment companies discussed, the 1940 Act has been unduly extended
into areas where the need for such regulation has not been shown to exist.
N THE course of investigating the part played by public utility
holding companies in the financial collapse of 1929 and sub-
sequent years, Congress discovered that investment companies were
usually found at the top of the complex public utility company
pyramids. Accordingly, section
30 of the Public Utility Hold-
THM AuTHoR (A.B., Swarthmore Col- ing Company Act of 1935,'
lege, LL.B., Harvard University) is a
practicing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio. which virtually outlawed such
pyramids, ordered the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to study the investment company industry and to submit
recommendations as to needed regulation. The Commission made
an extensive study which revealed shocking abuses, during the
1920's, by investment company managements, their investment ad-
visors, and underwriters.' As a result of this study, Congress sub-
sequently enacted the Investment Company Act of 19 4 0 ' (the 1940
Act), a monumentally comprehensive and detailed regulation of
the formation and day-to-day operation of investment companies.
The 1940 Act has, without question, accomplished much of its
149 Stat. 837, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1964).
2Three over-all reports were submitted to Congress. H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1939); H.R. DoC. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. Doc.
No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940). In addition, a number of supplemental reports
were made covering specialized areas of the study.
3 54 Star. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as 1940 Act]. References to the 1940 Act will be made to the section numbers of
Title I. For general discussions of the 1940 Act, see Jaretzki, The Investment Company
Act of 1940, 26 WAsH. U.LQ. 303 (1941); Motley, Jackson, & Barnard, Federal Reg-
ulation of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1134 (1950).
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original purpose with respect to the conventional type of open-end
"mutual funds" and closed-end investment companies which were
in existence at the time the 1940 Act was adopted. The vast in-
crease in the assets of such investment companies since 1940 is un-
deniable evidence of the restoration of public confidence in the in-
dustry.4 Indeed, the abuses at which the 1940 Act was directed
have been largely, if not entirely, eliminated.5
However, in recent years several unique types of "investment
companies" have come into existence which have presented prob-
lems of some magnitude to the SEC, to the courts, and, certainly, to
the companies involved. The purpose of this article is to review
briefly the application of the 1940 Act to these "investment com-
panies."
I. THE PERIPHERAL PROBLEMS
The new peripheral types of investment companies include
small business investment companies formed under the Small Busi-
ness Investment Act of 1958, insurance companies issuing variable
annuity policies, and bank-administered common trust funds offered
to the public. While the problems presented in each of these areas
differ, these "investment companies" have at least one element in
common. They each represent a concept or form of institution
which was not in being at the time the 1940 Act was adopted. In
view of the comprehensive and detailed regulation imposed by the
1940 Act, a regulatory pattern specifically directed at a pre-existing
industry, it is not surprising that these new situations have raised
some basic questions regarding the logic of the regulatory scheme
and the scope and purpose of the 1940 Act.
A. Definition of Investment Company and the
Exemption Pattern
The problems that have developed under the 1940 Act stem
from the necessarily broad and general definition of "investment
company" contained therein. The investment companies of the time
took many forms. Accordingly, the 1940 Act defined "investment
4 The estimated aggregate market value of assets of registered investment companies
increased from two and one-half billion dollars in 1941 to over forty-four billion dollars
as of June 30, 1965. 31 SEC ANN. R13'. 110 (1965).
5 For a comprehensive study of present problems in the mutual fund industry, see
SECQ A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962),
commonly known as the Wharton School Report.
6 72 Star. 689, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 661-96 (1964).
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company" to include any natural person, corporation, partnership,
association, joint stock company, trust, fund, or "any organized
group of persons whether incorporated or not" which issues or has
outstanding any security, and which (a) is engaged primarily in
the business of investing in securities, or (b) is engaged in the
business of investing in securities and owns "investment securities"
having a value exceeding forty per cent of the value of such issuer's
total assets (exclusive of government securities and cash items).'
"Investment securities" include all securities except government se-
curities, securities issued by "employees' securities companies," and
securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries which are not invest-
ment companies.'
An issuer owning investment securities having a value exceeding
forty per cent of the value of its total assets is nevertheless not an
investment company if it is primarily engaged, either directly or
through wholly owned subsidiaries, in a business or businesses other
than investing in securities.9 In addition, the Commission may find,
upon application and by order, that an issuer having more than forty
per cent of its assets in investment securities is primarily engaged
in a business other than investing in securities, either directly or
through majority-owned subsidiaries, or through controlled com-
panies conducting similar types of businesses.' °
Having defined "investment company" in such inclusive terms,
the 1940 Act goes on to exempt a long list of types of companies
which Congress presumably felt would otherwise be within this
definition, but with respect to which the safeguards of the 1940
Act were not required." Companies thus exempted include securi-
ties dealers, banks (if "supervsed and examined by State or Federal
authority"), insurance companies (if "subject to supervision by the
insurance commissioner or similar official or agency of a State"),
savings and loan associations, certain bank holding company affili-
ates supervised by the Federal Reserve Board, small loan or indus-
7 1940 Act § 3(a), 54 Star. 797, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1964). See
also 1940 Act § 3(a) (2), 54 Stat. 797, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (2) (1964),
which provides that an issuer which is engaged in the business of issuing "face-amount
certificates of the installment type" or has any such certificates outstanding is an invest-
ment company.
81940 Act 5 3 (a), 54 Star. 797, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (a) (1964).
91940 Act § 3(b) (1), 54 Stat. 797, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b) (1)
(1964).
10 1940 Act § 3(b)(2), 54 Stat. 797, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b) (2)
(1964).
"11940 Act § 3(c), 54 Stat. 798, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1964).
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trial banking companies, discount companies, companies regulated
under the Interstate Commerce Act' or registered under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,"3 and employee stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing trusts meeting the applicable requirements
of the Internal Revenue Code.'4 Also exempted are common trust
funds maintained by a bank for the collective investment of funds
contributed by the bank in its capacity as trustee or other fiduciary.
Both the Senate and House reports on the 1940 Act' 5 are silent
as to the reasons for these exemptions. However, one common
denominator appears to be that each exempted type of company is
either subject to some form of state or federal regulation or 'is en-
gaged in essentially a financing business.
Finally, section 6(c) of the 1940 Act'" gives to the SEC the
right, conditionally or unconditionally, to grant exemptions from
the 1940 Act or from any provisions thereof if "such exemption is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with
the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the
policy and provisions of this title."" This exemption power has,
however, been used sparingly.'"
With this background of the statutory pattern, the application
of the act to these new types of investment companies will now
be examined.
B. Small Business Investment Companies
With the adoption of the Small Business Investment Act of
1958,"° Congress established a program to facilitate the formation
of a new type of company, licensed and regulated by the Small Busi-
ness Administration (SBA) and designed to furnish equity capital
and long-term loan funds to small business concerns. It was the
expressed congressional intent that this program would stimulate
vast amounts of private capital to become available for the first time
to small business concerns.20
1224 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964).
1349 Stat. 804, 15 U.S.C. § 79(b) (1964).
14 INT. RFV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-07.
15S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
1654 Stat. 800, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6 (1964).
17 1940 Act § 6(c), 54 Stat. 800, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6 (1964).
18The SEC has "held that this broad power must not be so freely applied that the
basic objectives of the Act are thwarted." Transit Inv. Corp., 28 S.E.C. 10, 15 (1948).
1972 Stat. 694, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
20 This congressional intent is spelled out in the first section of the act.
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In order to obtain a license as a small business investment com-
pany (SBIC), an applicant must submit to the SBA a "proposal"
setting forth in extensive detail information regarding all aspects
of its proposed operations: its capitalization and plans for securing
additional capital; its investment policies; the terms of the securities
in which it proposes to invest; the fees, interest rates, and discounts
it proposes to charge; the procedure for approval of investments;
personnel to be employed, their duties and rates of compensation;
and the internal controls to be adopted, including fidelity bonds to
be secured and custodianship arrangements.2' The proposal form
must also name each person who will be an officer, director, or ten
per cent stockholder of the SBIC, the proposed annual compensa-
tion of each such person, and the amount of stock of the SBIC which
each such person will own. Biographical information must be sub-
mitted with respect to each officer and director, including his educa-
tion and business experience, and disclosure must be made of all
other companies with which he is affiliated as an officer, director, or
ten per cent stockholder. All material contracts relating to the man-
agement and operation of the SBIC must be submitted and approved
by the SBA.
After the SBIC receives its license, any change in its policies, plans
of operation, or in its officers, directors, and ten per cent stockholders,
or any other departure from the proposal, must first be approved by
the SBA and the proposal amended accordingly. The SBA re-
quires comprehensive and voluminous semi-annual financial and
operations reports, and field examinations are made periodically.
Existing regulations of the SBA require at least forty per cent of
the board of directors of an SBIC to be independent of any affilia-
tion with its officers, directors, or ten per cent stockholders. Con-
flicts of interest and self-dealing between an SBIC, its officers, di-
rectors, or ten per cent stockholders, or any of their affiliates, are
subject to detailed prohibitions. Any corporate reorganization or sale
of additional securities by the SBIC must first be approved by the
SBA.22 The public offering of its stock by an SBIC also, of course,
2 1 The statutory provisions are contained in Small Business Investment Act of 1958,
301, 72 Stat. 691, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 681(a) (1964). See SBA Form 414
for the detailed requirements of a "Proposal to Operate a Small Business Investment
Company."
22 Regulations currently applicable to small business investment companies are con-
tained in 13 C.F.R. § 107 (Cum. Supp. 1965), as amended, 30 Fed. Reg. 534 (1965),
30 Fed. Reg. 1187 (1965), 30 Fed. Reg. 2652-54 (1965), 30 Fed. Reg. 3635 (1965),
30 Fed. Reg. 3856 (1965), 30 Fed. Reg. 7597 (1965), 30 Fed. Reg. 7651 (1965), 30
Fed. Reg. 8775 (1965).
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requires a prior registration with the SEC under the Securities Act
of 1933.23
At the time the Small Business Investment Act24 was adopted,
and on several subsequent occasions, the SEC has opposed a blanket
legislative exemption for SBIC's from the 1940 Act.25 It has,
however, made additions to its rules under the 1940 Act to meet
a number of the problems presented by the different nature of
SBIC's from the usual investment company.26
C. Variable Annuities
Since about 1950, the idea of a variable annuity insurance con-
tract designed to afford protection of retirement income against in-
flation began to grow in the insurance industry.27 The continuing
post-war inflation furnished dramatic evidence of the need for such
protection.
While details vary among the contracts offered, the essential
features of the variable annuity contracts are similar. The pur-
chaser makes periodic payments of a fixed amount over a period of
years referred to as the "pay-in-period." The proceeds, after pay-
ment of expenses, are invested in a portfolio of securities, largely
common stocks. Upon each payment, the purchaser is credited
with "units" representing the proportionate interest in the fund to
which each payment entitles him. The cost attributed to these
units will fluctuate with the size of the fund and the investment
results achieved. Upon reaching retirement, the purchaser is en-
tided to receive during the "pay-out period" periodic annuity pay-
ments in varying dollar amounts, determined by the total number
of units accumulated by him during the pay-in period and by the
value of that number of units from time to time during the pay-
out period. Such value will vary, depending upon the continuing
investment results of the fund. While the issuing insurance com-
23 Securities Act of 1933, § 6, 48 Stat. 78, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1964). See also Invest-
ment Co. Act Form N-5, 3 CCH FED. SEc_. L. REP. J 51441 (1958).
2472 Stat. 694 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
2524 SEC ANN. REP. 11, 12 (1958); 26 SEC ANN. RiEp. 12 (1960). See Con-
will, Protection or Oppression? The Investment Company Act Impact on the Publicly
Held SBIC, 19 Bus. LAw. 345 (1964).
26 See Rules and Regulations, 1940 Act, 3c-1, -2, 17a-6, 17d-1 (d) (3), 17d-2, l8c-1,
17 C.F.R. § 270 (1965).
27 Current interest in variable annuities apparently dates from the publication of a
monograph in 1950 by Dr. William C. Greenough, Vice President of Teachers' Insur-




pany thus does not assume the investment risk that is involved with
fixed dollar insurance, it continues to assume the actuarial risk of
longevity. The obligation to continue to pay the annuity for the
lifetime of the annuitant, or for the period of such other pay-out
option as he may elect, is absolute.
The first of the variable annuity insurance contracts appear
to have been issued by Participating Annuity Life Insurance Com-
pany in 1954. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company
(VALIC) commenced issuing such contracts in 1955. Shortly
thereafter, the SEC instituted a proceeding against VALIC and an-
other similar company to enjoin the sale of such contracts, assert-
ing that they constituted "securities," the offering of which must be
registered under the Securities Act of 193328 and that the issuers
were "investment companies" under the 1940 Act.29
Both the District Court30 and the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia3 denied the injunction requested by the SEC. The
Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and, in a five to four
decision, upheld the 'SEC's position.32 The majority opinion con-
cluded that for the issuer to bear only the risk of longevity was not
sufficient to constitute insurance since "in common understanding
'insurance' involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of the
benefits will be payable in fixed amounts."33
While the VALIC decision answered the question as to the
necessity of registration of variable annuities under the Securities
Act of 1933," there remained at least one major question as to the
status of the issuers of variable annuities under the 1940 Act.
VALIC was admittedly primarily engaged in issuing variable an-
nuides. The exemption for insurance companies under the 1940
Act is confined to companies "whose primary and predominant
business activity" is the writing of insurance.8 Accordingly, Pru-
2848 Star. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 77a-aa (1964).
2 9 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.
1957), affd, 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cit. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
8 0 Ibid.
3 1 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
rev'd, 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
3 2 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
3Id. at 71. The decision by the court in VALIC did not escape criticism. See, e.g.,
Mearns, The Commission, the Variable Annuity, and the Inconsiderate Sovereign, 45
VA. L. REv. 831 (1959).
3448 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
351940 Act § 2(a) (17), 54 Stat. 793, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (17)
(1964).
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dential Insurance Company of America filed an application before
the SEC in 1961 seeking a determination that variable annuity poli-
cies issued by it would not require a registration under the 1940 Act
since, for the foreseeable future, Prudential's "primary and pre-
dominant business activity" would consist of issuing fixed obliga-
tion insurance.
The SEC confirmed Prudential's contention that it was entitled
to the exemption for insurance companies under the 1940 Act."6
However, it found that Prudential's variable annuity investment ac-
count would, itself, constitute an investment company which, as an
issuer of securities, must be registered under the 1940 Act, and that
Prudential would be the "investment adviser" and "principal un-
derwriter" for that investment company." The SEC opinion ap-
pears to recognize that the security "issued" by the investment ac-
count is actually a contract of Prudential but asserts that the fact
that "Prudential may in the same contract also make, in its own
name and backed by its own assets, certain insurance or annuity
promises is... irrelevant."3 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the decision and a petition for certiorari was
denied."
By the adoption of Rule 3c-34" under the 1940 Act, the SEC
has made it clear that the decisions in the VALIC and Prudential
cases do not apply to certain group variable annuity contracts for
employees under pension or similar plans meeting the requirements
of section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code,4 even where the
employees as well as the employer make contributions under the
plan. As amended in 1964, this rule exempts, with respect to such
group contracts, both the insurance company involved and the id-
vestment account from the provisions of the 1940 Act."
36 Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 3620 (Jan.
22, 1963), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 76891 (Transfer Binder, 1961-64).
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 953 (1964). In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that a variable annuity under which the purchaser was guaranteed annuity
payments at least equal to the premiums paid, plus a share in any investment profits,
constituted insurance rather than a security, and that the issuer of the annuity was,
therefore, not subject to the 1940 Act. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., CCH FED.
SEC L. REP. 9 91640 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
40 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-3 (Supp. 1965).
41 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
42 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-3 (Supp. 1965). See Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability
of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 795 (1964), for an excellent general discussion of this area.
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D. Bank-Administered Common Trust Funds
At the time of adoption of the 1940 Act, the Federal Reserve
Board Regulations limited the creation of common trust funds by
banks to situations where the fund was "used for bona fide fidu-
ciary purposes rather than as a medium for general public invest-
ment."43  Section 3(c) (3) of the 1940 Act contains a similar
exemption for common trust funds maintained by a bank for the
investment "of moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its ca-
pacity as a trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian.""'
Such limitations on the creation of common trust funds by
banks remained substantially unchanged until 1963, when under
the amended Regulation 945 the Comptroller of the Currency
authorized national banks to create a "common trust fund, main-
tained by the bank exclusively for the collective investment and
reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its ca-
pacity as managing agent under a managing agency agreement ex-
pressly providing that such monies are received by the bank in
trust.
46
The revised Regulation 9 required that each common trust
fund must be established and maintained in accordance with a
written plan filed with the Comptroller of the Currency. The plan
must set forth how the fund is to be operated, the investment
powers given to the bank with respect to the fund, the terms and
conditions of admission or withdrawal of participants in the fund,
and the auditing of accounts of the bank with respect to the fund.
Provision is made for annual reports to be given to each person
entitled to an accounting of the fund.
In a letter accompanying the revision of Regulation 9, the
Comptroller of the Currency warned that there can be no mass
merchandising under the regulation and that a bank which pub-
lished "an advertisement which made other than incidental mention
of its common trust fund in the course of advertising the range of
the bank's fiduciary services, would violate this Regulation."4
Despite this limitation on "mass merchandising," the SEC
promptly took the position that interests in such bank-administered
43 H.R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1939) (Report of the SEC on
Common Trust Funds).
4454 Stat 797, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 c) (3) (1964).
45 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a) (3) (Supp. 1965).
46 Ibid.
47 Letter of James J. Saxon, April 5, 1963.
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common trust funds were securities which must be registered under
the Securities Act of 1933 and that the fund itself was an invest-
ment company under the 1940 Act. As a result, the proposed
Bank Collective Investment Fund Act of 1963 was introduced in
Congress.48 This act sought to exempt interests in bank-admin-
istered common trust funds from the application of the federal
securities laws but would have imposed certain disclosure require-
ments on such funds. The SEC opposed the adoption of the act
and it was not passed. A similar bill introduced in the present
Congress appears to have died in committee."
In 1965, the First National City Bank of New York filed with
the SEC an application for exemption from certain provisions of
the 1940 Act on behalf of its "Commingled Investment Account.""
The application stated that the Commingled Account would be
created pursuant to Regulation 9 of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency and would accept investments of 10,000 dollars or more pur-
suant to managing agency agreements authorizing the Bank to
place such funds in the Commingled Account. The application
further stated that the Bank would register the Commingled Ac-
count under the 1940 Act and would offer interests therein pur-
suant to a registration statement and prospectus in compliance with
the Securities Act of 1933."1 Permanent exemptions were re-
quested from five provisions of the 1940 Act, the principal ones
relating to requirements regarding the functions and affiliations of
the "board of directors" of the Commingled Account. The Bank
proposed that a committee elected by participants in the Com-
mingled Account act as its "board of directors," and that the com-
mittee at all times have at least one member unaffiliated with the
Bank. It was also proposed that the Bank serve as the investment
adviser to the Commingled Account and determine what securities
are to be purchased and sold. Both the Investment Company In-
stitute and the National Association of Securities Dealers filed
briefs in opposition to the granting of the requested exemptions,
alleging, among other things, that the Bank rather than the Com-
mittee actually controlled the Commingled Account. In March of
this year, the SEC granted four of the five requested exemptions,
48 S. 2223, H.R. 8499, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
49 The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1966, p. 5, col. 2 (Midwest ed.).
5 0 First Nat'l City Bank (Commingled Investment Account) SEC File No. 812-
1823.
5148 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
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insisting only that forty per cent of the Committee be unaffiliated
with the Bank 2
I. CONSEQUENCES OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
1940 AcT
It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the effect of regula-
tion under the 1940 Act on the SBIC program. It is, however, per-
fectly clear that a number of problems arising from this regulation
have plagued the SEC and SBIC's since 1958.53 Because of the dif-
ferent nature of the business of SBIC's from that of the usual invest-
ment company, it is not surprising that such problems arose. For
example, in many situations an SBIC could not amend an existing
loan agreement to provide for ordinary and often essential changes,
such as an extension of repayment schedules, without filing an ap-
plication for approval with the SEC. Exercise of warrants" often
required a similar application and approving order from the SEC.
Efforts to resolve these and other problems have involved long
and frustrating delays to the SBIC industry and have consumed
a disproportionate amount of SEC staff time.5 The dual and de-
tailed regulation by SBA and the SEC has inevitably contributed to
the discouragements of SBIC managements to the extent that there
appears to be a valid basis for the contention that the SBIC indus-
try is the most regulated segment of the economy."
Despite the extensive investor protection afforded by the 1940
Act, the public has not been favorably inclined to SBIC securities.57
For whatever reason, it is apparent that the SBIC program has not
52 First Nat'l City Bank, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 4538 (March 9,
1966), CCH FED. Src. L. REP. 9 77332 (1966). Commissioner Budge dissented on
the ground that the arrangement violated provisions of the Banking Act of 1933.
5 3 See Conwill, supra note 25.
54 SBIC's have typically financed small business concerns by purchasing debentures
which are either convertible into common stock of the small business concern or which
are accompanied by warrants to subscribe for common stock. If, as is often the case, the
small business concern comes within the 1940 Act definition of an "affiliated person"
of the SBIC, the sale of additional stock to the SBIC is prohibited by section 17 of the
1940 Act.
55 The rules adopted under the 1940 Act which deal specifically with SBIC's are
set forth in note 26 sapra.
56 In the interests of full disclosure, the author has acted as counsel for an SBIC
since 1960 and readily admits to a lack of objectivity in this area.
57 The SBIC Marker Report for January 1965, published by S. M. Rubel and Com-
pany, Chicago, Illinois, reported that the market price of the SBIC shares included in
its SBIC Price Index averaged 73% of the underlying asset values of such shares as of
December 31, 1965. Even greater discounts from asset values of SBIC shares have been
common since 1962.
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realized congressional aspirations, and the program currently ap-
pears to be shrinking.5"
It is considerably easier to measure the impact of the 1940 Act
on the issuance of variable annuities by insurance companies. As a
result of the VALIC and Prudential decisions, the availability of
such policies to individuals is limited. VALIC has registered as an
investment company and with the benefit of a series of exemptions
from provisions of the 1940 Act granted by the SEC,59 it is offering
variable annuities on an individual and group basis. Prudential, on
the other hand, is offering variable annuities only on a group basis
under the rule adopted by the SEC referred to previously. In both
cases the offerings are made pursuant to a registration statement
and prospectus filed under the Securities Act of 1933.60
An individual who wishes the protection against inflation of-
fered by a variable annuity policy must, it appears, acquire such a
policy from a company which is primarily engaged in issuing that
type of policy. The major life insurance companies which have sub-
stantially greater assets to underwrite the longevity risk and also
have extensive insurance and investment experience are, at present,
effectively precluded from issuing such policies to individuals.
Whether this limitation on the source of individual variable an-
nuity policies is in the best interest of the "investor" may not be en-
tirely free from doubt.
The effect of the application of the 1940 Act to bank-sponsored
common trust funds will have to be determined at a later date. At
this writing, First National City Bank of New York is the only bank
to have obtained the necessary exemptions from the SEC and its
Commingled Account has only recently been put into operation.
III. THE LOGIC OF THE REGULATORY PATTERN
This review of the application of the 1940 Act to three types of
"investment companies" not in being at the time of the 1940 Act's
adoption raises several questions as to the logic of the regulatory
pattern. With respect to SBIC's, there appears to be a legitimate
58 Marine Capital Corporation and Growth Capital, Inc., two publicly held SBIC's,
have announced their intention to transfer their SBIC licenses to wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries, subject to obtaining necessary approvals and exemptions from the SBA and
the SEC. If these programs are carried out, their SBIC activities will be reduced sub-
stantially.
59 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 39 S.E.C. 680 (1960); Variable An-
nuity Life Ins. Co., SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 4217 (April 7, 1965).
6048 Star. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §S 77a-aa (1964).
1022
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
question as to the consistency of exemptions in that small loan and
industrial banking companies, discount companies, and the like are
allowed such exemptions, while no exemption is afforded SBIC's de-
spite much more extensive regulation by the SBA. The SEC, on sev-
eral occasions, has pointed out that regulation by the SBA is not a
substitute for SEC regulation since the SBA is not concerned as such
with the protection of stockholders;"' and although a number of
SBA regulations appear to be motivated, at least in part, by the de-
sire to protect stockholders, it is certainly true that this is not the
primary function of SBA. On the other hand, it would appear to
be equally true that protection of stockholders is not the primary
function of state insurance commissioners or state or federal bank-
ing authorities, regulation by which is a prerequisite for the exemp-
tion of insurance companies or banks under the 1940 Act.2
According to the SEC, the fundamental problem with Pruden-
tial's requests for exemptions63 with respect to its proposed variable
annuities was that they contemplated "total exemption from all of
the sections of the Act which together express and effectuate the
policy that those at risk in investment funds should have ultimate
voice in their management and policy." 4 The SEC further states in
its opinion in the Prudential case:
Specifically, the Act requires that those having funds at risk in
the equity securities of an investment fund elect its directors. The
directors or the holders must recurrendy review the principal un-
derwriting and investment advisory arrangements and have the
power to change or terminate them. Holders must pass on changes
in investment policy and ratify the selection by the directors of the
independent auditors of the fund."
While this is certainly the policy of the 1940 Act, it is some-
what difficult to understand why these safeguards are required with
respect to individual variable annuities and not with respect to group
variable annuities qualified under section 401 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. Those with "funds at risk in the equity securities of an
investment fund" which happens to be a group plan have no such
61 See authorities cited in note 25 supra.
621940 Act §§ 2(a) (5), (17), 54 Stat. 790, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80-
2(a) (5), (17) (1964).
63 See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
64 Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 3620 (Jan.
22, 1963), CCHI FBD. SEC. L. REP. 5 76891, at 81293 (Transfer Binder, 1961-64).
651d. at 81293-94.
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vote. Regulation with respect to investor protection is hardly the
criterion in this instance.66
Even more difficult to reconcile is the action of the SEC with re-
spect to VALIC's application for exemptions from the 1940 Act.67
Since VALIC itself registered as an investment company, the SEC
found that it was unnecessary for its variable annuity fund to regis-
ter and granted it a blanket exemption." While VALIC's variable
annuity holders are given the right to vote along with the holders
of its voting stock, there appears to be no assurance as to the propor-
tion of the total voting power of the company to be held by the
variable annuity holders.69 Accordingly, it may be questioned
whether the rights deemed essential by the SEC in the Prudential
case, as set forth above, are, in fact, possessed by VALIC's variable
annuity holders. Certainly, they appear not to have the right to
terminate the principal underwriting and investment advisory ar-
rangements - a fundamental policy of the 1940 Act. In view of
the fact that VALIC, and not its variable annuity fund, actually is-
sues the annuity contract, and that VALIC continues to carry the
risk of longevity, any termination of the connection with VALIC
would seem to present legal and mechanical problems of some mag-
nitude. Such problems appear to result inherently from the deter-
mination that a variable annuity fund is a separate and distinct in-
vestment company.
Many of the same problems are involved in the exemptions
granted for the Commingled Account of First National City Bank
of New York.7" While the Committee to be elected by the partici-
pants in the Commingled Account is deemed to be its board of di-
rectors, the Bank itself determines its purchases and sales of securi-
ties. Whether this arrangement gives the investor the "ultimate
6 6 Regulation specifically for the protection of investors does not appear to have
motivated the statutory exemption for pension and profit sharing plans meeting Inter-
nal Revenue Code requirements or for companies subject to regulation under the Inter-
state Commerce Act.
6 7 See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
68 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 39 S.E.C. 680 (1960).
69 VALIC proposed to allocate voting rights by determining the asset value per share
of its voting common stock and dividing that amount into the redemption value of each
variable annuity contract which is in the pay-in period and into the reserve for each
such contract which is in the pay-out period. The quotient obtained in each case would
be the number of votes entitied to be cast by the variable annuity contract holder, with
the holders of the common stock entitled to one vote per share. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co. of America, 39 S.E.C. 680, 695 (1960).
70 See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
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voice" in the management of his investment funds is, at best, open
to question.
Regardless of problems as to the logic behind the exemptions
granted, a much more fundamental question is involved. For many
years before and since the adoption of the 1940 Act, banks have
been managing and investing billions of dollars in their fiduciary
capacities, both through individual trust accounts and through com-
mon trust funds. The beneficiaries of such accounts have had none
of the protections afforded by the 1940 Act, but the protections
afforded by state and federal regulatory authorities appear to have
been adequate. To conclude that "those with funds at risk in the
equity securities of an investment fund"71 operated by a bank require
the protection of the 1940 Act if an agency account but not if a
fiduciary account is involved, would seem to overemphasize form
without regard to substance.
The legislative history of the 1940 Act contains numerous ref-
erences to banks and insurance companies, contrasting their existing
regulation with the then totally unregulated investment companies.
No instance of the types of scandalous activity found in investment
companies during the 1920's are reported with respect to bank-oper-
ated common trust funds. In its study of investment companies,
the SEC noted:
The formation of investment companies ... [during 1921-1926]
was materially facilitated by the virtual absence of statutory re-
straint or governmental regulation or supervision with respect to
the organization of investment trusts and investment companies,
the nature of their capital structure, the scope or character of
their activities, or their relationship and transactions with their
sponsors. Unlike banks, insurance companies, and trust funds,
the new investment vehicle enjoyed almost complete freedom
from any protective restrictions."2
Throughout the legislative materials there are recurrent contrasts
between investment companies and banks and insurance companies.
For example, the Senate Committee, in the course of describing face-
amount certificates, stated:
Although savings banks and insurance companies are subject
to strict regulation as to assets and reserves, the face-amount cer-
tificate companies have operated without such uniform type of
regulation with the result that in some cases, assets have been car-
71Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 3620 (Jan.
22, 1963), CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 76891, at 81293-94 (Transfer Binder, 1961-64).
72 H Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 63 (1939).
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tied at highly fictitious values and, in other cases, inadequate re-
serves have been maintained for the fixed obligations.73
If logic is to be restored to the regulatory pattern under the
1940 Act, it is suggested that a key may lie in these quotations. It
is apparent from the foregoing review that the mechanical applica-
tion of an abstract definition drafted in 1940 to situations which
have developed in the 1960's has raised some legitimate questions.
It is also apparent that the definition in question, and the 1940 Act
itself, are predicated on an extensive study of the wrongdoings of
investment companies which occurred during the 1920's. Since that
relatively lawless - and from a financial regulation standpoint, pre-
historic - era, the atmosphere surrounding the issuance and sale of
securities, the management of corporations, and the rights and reme-
dies of shareholders has drastically changed. The Securities Act of
1933"4 required full disclosure in connection with the public sale of
securities. The Securities Exchange Act of 19347' imposed numer-
ous requirements on companies whose shares are listed on national
securities exchanges, including the proxy rules, periodic reporting
requirements, and the short-swing profit provisions of section 16
applicable to officers, directors, and ten per cent stockholders. While
in 1940 most investment companies were not listed on a securities
exchange, the Securities Acts Amendments of 196476 imposed many
of the same requirements, including specifically the proxy rules and
the short-swing profit and periodic reporting requirement provisions,
on unlisted companies with more than 500 shareholders and assets
of more than one million dollars." Investment companies regis-
tered under the 1940 Act are exempted from these requirements
since they are already subject to them under the 1940 Act.7" Banks
and insurance companies are presently subject to the 1964 amend-
ments, and a determination that publicly held SBIC's are not invest-
ment companies would bring the provisions of the 1964 amend-
ments into play in substantially every case." In this connection,
738S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940).
7448 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1964).
75 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-jj (1964).
7 6 Pub. L. No. 467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964).
7778 Stat. 565, 15 U.S.C. 781 (1964).
7 8 Section 12(g) (2) (B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as added by the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 48 Stat. 892, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2)
(B) (1964).
7 9 Administration of provisions of the 1964 Amendments with respect to banks is
vested in the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
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the prophylactic effect of the disclosure requirements of the proxy
rules should not be disregarded, particularly as such requirements
are expanded."0
In addition to the extension of statutory regulation since the
1920's, an even more comprehensive regulatory force has developed,
primarily since the end of World War II, and largely supported by
the SEC. It consists of shareholder remedies against wrongdoing of
all kinds by corporate managements and principal stockholders.8
Coupled with the extensive disclosure requirements of the various
SEC administered acts, the stockholder derivative suit has become
a potent deterrent to wrongdoing by corporate managements, a de-
terrent which can be considerably more effective and more pervasive
than governmental regulations.
In view of the foregoing developments which postdate the
studies giving rise to the 1940 Act, and which in large part postdate
the 1940 Act itself, it can hardly be asserted that the 1940 Act is all
that stands between the investing public and a recurrence of the
shocking behavior of investment companies and their managements
in the 1920's.
IV. CONCLUSION
It can, perhaps, be argued that more regulation for the protec-
tion of investors is desirable in all types of companies, and that
shareholders in industrial and other companies might benefit from
the application of some of the "safeguards" contained in the 1940
Act. And it can be expected that in coming years additional legis-
lation will be enacted for the protection of investors as studies by
the SEC and others indicate the need. However, unless a departure
is to be made from some fairly fundamental governmental philoso-
serve System, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1964). Insurance companies are exempt from the 1964
amendments only if subject to similar regulation by the insurance commissioner of its
domiciliary state. 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2) (G)
(1964).
80 See, e.g., amended Item 7(f) of the Proxy Rules which expands the reporting
requirements with respect to transactions in which officers, directors and principal share-
holders have an interest - the so-called "Chrysler rule." SEC Securities Act Release
No. 7804, Jan. 27, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 2592 (1966).81 The Texas Gulf Sulphur cases pending in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York (SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., Civil No. 1512/
1965, S.D.N.Y., complaint filed, May 19, 1965; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., Civil
No. 1182/1965, S.D.N.Y., complaint filed, April 19, 1965) represent the most recent
efforts to extend the remedies of shareholders and others under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits
for Violation of Rule 10b-5, 79 HARV. L. REV. 656 (1966).
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phy, additional regulation will be imposed only where a dear need
for it is shown. It is suggested that such a need has not been shown
in applying the 1940 Act to the peripheral types of investment com-
panies discussed here. There is certainly no demonstration whatso-
ever of wrongdoing by the managements of such companies or of
the inadequacy of the regulation to which each is already subject.
Application of the 1940 Act under these circumstances is to base
regulation solely on conjecture. It is also suggested that it is diffi-
cult to reconcile the existing statutory exemption pattern with the
inclusion of these new investment companies.
While the SEC has the authority to exempt these companies,82
it has declined to do so. In view of the potential magnitude of the
activities of these new types of companies, the granting of exemp-
tions should properly be the responsibility of Congress. This re-
sponsibility arises from the all-inclusive definition of investment
company which Congress enacted in 1940, a definition which has
led to an extension of the 1940 Act into areas well beyond those in
which the present need for such comprehensive regulation has been
shown to exist.
82 See text accompanying notes 16-19 suapra.
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